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In this paper we use credit rating data from two Swedish banks to elicit
evidence on these banks’ loan monitoring ability. We do so by compar-
ing the ability of bank ratings to predict loan defaults relative to that of
public ratings from the Swedish credit bureau. We test the banks’ abilil-
ity to forecast the credit bureau’s ratings and vice versa. We show that
one of the banks has a superior predictive ability relative to the credit bu-
reau. This is evidence that bank credit ratings do contain valuable private
information and suggests they may be be a reasonable basis for risk man-
agement. However, public ratings are also found to have predictive ability
for future bank ratings, indicating that risk analysis should be based on
both public and bank ratings. The methods we use represent a new basket
of straightforward techniques that enable both ﬁnancial institutions and
regulators to assess the performance of credit ratings systems.
Keywords: Monitoring, banks, credit bureau, private information,
ratings, regulation, supervision.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
How can bank managers, investors, bank regulators and other stakeholders know
whether a bank is a good monitor? This question has gained in importance since
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1the onset of the recent ﬁnancial crisis, during which a large number of banks
around the world have shown to be insuﬃciently attentive to risks within their
portfolios. In this paper we develop and test a method for quantifying the
ability of a bank to monitor its commercial loans. We are able to do so by using
both internal bank credit ratings and external credit bureau ratings of corporate
borrowers and investigating if bank ratings are able to forecast the ratings of
the public monitor. If banks collect private information about the borrowers
they monitor, as economic theory tells us, in addition to the public information
that a credit bureau possesses, and if credit ratings summarize the information
included in them, then bank credit ratings should be able to forecast future
changes in credit bureau ratings. On the other hand, credit bureau ratings
should not be able to predict changes bank ratings.
Diamond (1984) and Fama (1985) ﬁrst put forth the hypothesis that banks
were special relative to alternative lenders: Investors delegate the monitoring of
borrowers to ﬁnancial intermediaries because the latter are more eﬃcient. Then,
provided banks are suﬃciently large and diversiﬁed, lending through such inter-
mediaries dominates direct lending by investors. Research in this area has been
extensive. Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Mester, Nakamura and Renault
(2007) describe in detail how banks’ monitoring activities, by using transaction
account information that provides ongoing data on borrowers’ activities, makes
these intermediaries superior monitors of loans. Another strand of literature
has studied what conditions may weaken banks’ or other investors’ monitoring
eﬀorts. Recent work has also shown that screening and monitoring quality by ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries dropped substantially in the wake of the current ﬁnancial
crisis (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig,.2009). However, the general notion that
ﬁnancial intermediaries are superior monitors relative to, for example, public
alternatives and other investors, remains empirically unchallenged. In particu-
lar, the informational superiority of bank credit ratings over public alternatives
has not been demonstrated empirically.
The ability of a bank to collect private information and thereby produce a
superior judgement of borrowers’ expected performance is of relevance not only
for regulators and banks, but potentially also for the industrial organization of
borrowers and for business cycle theory. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004),f o r
example, have pointed out that informational asymmetries among lenders aﬀect
banks’ ability to extract monopolistic rents by charging high interest rates. As
a result, banks ﬁnance borrowers of relatively lower quality in markets char-
acterized by greater information asymmetries. When forced to curtail lending,
they reallocate their loan portfolio towards more creditworthy, more captured
borrowers. Povel, Singh and Winton (2007) investigate the relation between the
cost of monitoring,and reporting fraud incentives for companies across the busi-
ness cycle. Their work has implications for how carefully ﬁnancial institutions
should scrutinize ﬁrms in which they invest and for the gains from increased
informativeness of publicly available information.
The focus of this paper is on proposing a new basket of straightforward
techniques that enable both ﬁnancial institutions and regulators to assess the
performance of credit ratings systems. We present a new test that emphasizes
2the forecasting power of informationally superior estimates of creditworthiness
We do so by carrying out quantitative tests of the relative informativeness of
banks and credit bureaus, as revealed by their credit ratings.1 In our theo-
retical model, we have two monitors: a private monitor, i.e. the bank, and a
public monitor, i.e. the credit bureau. Both monitors receive noisy signals of the
borrower’s creditworthiness. The public monitor receives a public signal, while
the private monitor receives both a public and a private signal. We think of
creditworthiness as being a monotonic transform of the probability of default.2
and model it as a variate that follows a random walk with normal disturbances.
Each monitor processes its noisy signals to make an optimal estimate of the
borrower’s creditworthiness using a Kalman ﬁlter. The output from this esti-
mation, a continuous processed signal, is then reported in a coarsened form as
a discrete categorical rating. A consequence of this coarsening is that some of
the information in the continuous signal is lost.3
While we do not investigate at length if credit ratings are indeed able to
forecast defaults, we do assess whether the bank credit ratings are suﬃcient
statistics for forecasting default or whether there is information in the public
credit ratings that has not been impounded in the bank ratings.4 We perform
tests of the ability of the two types of ratings to forecast default using semi-
parametric Cox proportional hazard regressions; in particular, we can ask if the
public credit ratings add information to the bank credit ratings in forecasting
default.
A limitation of default forecasts is that they focus, of necessity, on the riskier
end of the default risk spectrum. Tests based on such ratings tend to have rel-
atively low power, as defaults occur relatively seldom and tend to bunch tem-
porally (Das, Duﬃe, Kapadia and Saita, 2007). 5 One additional complication
is that the credit bureau is mainly concerned with predicting legal events of
1Grunert, Norden and Weber (2005) present information on non-ﬁnancial factors in internal
credit ratings which suggest that judgmental factors are valuable in bank credit ratings, but
acknowledge that such information may be obtained by public monitors such as bond rating
agencies.
2Löﬄer (2004) a n dA l t m a na n dR i j k e n(2004) argue that credit ratings may have a more
complex objective than summarizing default risk. In our case we know that the sole objective
of the bank and credit bureau ratings is to predict counterparty default risk. We will later
return to the exact deﬁnition of a default.
3There is not yet any formalized rationale for why this coarsening takes place.
4We do not investigate at length if credit ratings are indeed able to forecast defaults,
since there is already an extensive body of work on bond - and other credit ratings that, for
example, tests the value of bond ratings relative to other ﬁnancial data in forecasting defaults,
interest rate spreads, and portfolio governance. Cantor (2004) and Krahnen and Weber (2001)
contain a summary of and references to recent research in this area. Default forecasts focus,
of necessity, on the riskier end of the default risk spectrum. Tests based on such ratings tend
to have relatively low power as defaults occur relatively seldom and tend to bunch temporally
(Das et al., 2007).
5Other potential complications that may occur and need to be addressed when using de-
faults and default forecasts as a measure of bank information is that they may be endogenous;
a bank’s belief that a borrower’s creditworthiness has fallen or will fall may cause the lender
to reduce the borrower’s access to credit, thereby raising the likelihood of default. See Carey
and Hrycay (2001) for these and other diﬃculties with ratings.
3default and bankruptcy, while banks are more concerned about regulatory def-
initions of default. For example, banks typically reserve against a credit when
loan delinquency extends past 60 days. These two events are closely related,
but they are not identical. Credit bureau defaults normally concern legal bank-
ruptcies. In our tests, we use both a credit-bureau-based deﬁnition of default
and a bank-based deﬁnition of default.
Banks’ internal credit ratings, taken as a group, summarize the risk charac-
teristics of the bank loan portfolio. Bank managers employ them to manage the
bank’s overall risk proﬁle and regulators, under the Basel II accord, use them to
measure the riskiness of banks and the capital they require for safe operation.
Sometimes, credit ratings are used by bank managers to monitor the eﬀective-
ness of individual loan oﬃcers. Credit ratings can also be viewed as potential
evidence of the private information banks possess, i.e., private information that
reduces the liquidity of loans but also gives the bank a special value as a lender.
Treacy and Carey (2000) and English and Nelson (1998) describe U.S. bank
credit rating systems while Jacobson, Lindé and Roszbach (2006) and Krahnen
and Weber (2001) do the equivalent for European bank credit rating systems.
These descriptions display so many similarities that it appears reasonable to
think of a common set of principles underlying bank credit rating systems, at
least for developed economies. Banks are not the only providers of credit rat-
ings, however. Other common producers of credit ratings for businesses are
credit bureaus and bond rating agencies. These ratings are typically public in-
formation, which can and ought to be impounded in the credit ratings produced
by banks.
We want to show that the bank, in its role as a loan monitor, acquires in-
formation about the borrower that is not in the public signal. This private
information should enable the bank to forecast movements in the public sig-
nal. In the context of credit ratings, one would expect bank credit ratings to
be more precise than those of credit bureaus or bond raters in evaluating the
creditworthiness of loans. A more formal way to think about this is that the
Kalman ﬁlter of a monitor who obtains a signal with greater precision places
greater weight on recent signals than the ﬁlter of a monitor who obtains a less
precise signal. Under these conditions the bank has a more precise signal than
the public signal because it combines the public signal with additional infor-
mation. At the same time, the public monitor’s signal should not be able to
forecast the bank’s signal, since all information in the public monitor’s signal
is embedded in the bank’s signal. Thus if one has access to the underlying
continuous optimally-processed signals, one would have clean tests at hand for
the presence of private information in the bank: a bank’s signal of creditworthi-
ness should forecast (Granger cause) the public monitor’s signal, but vice versa
public signals should not forecast private signals. If the public monitor’s credit
rating were to forecast the bank’s credit rating, then this would constitute prima
facie evidence that the bank’s credit rating is not a suﬃcient statistic for the
borrower’s creditworthiness. Hence regulators should look beyond the bank’s
credit rating to measure the riskiness of that bank’s loan portfolio.
The technique we use here is related to the methodology in Berger, Davies
4and Flannery (2000), who use vector autoregressions and Granger-causality to
compare market and supervisory assessments of bank performance. In par-
ticular, they examine bank supervisors’ assessments of banks and bond rating
agencies ratings, as a test of the relative information of supervisors and rating
agencies. However, they do not imbed their tests within an explicit model of
information updating as we do. As a consequence, we have tighter tests that
are more explicit about the sources of apparent violations of optimal forecasting
theory.
We show that both the banks that we study do not pass the stringent test
described above mentioned, i.e., the public signal has predictive power for future
changes in the private signal. This implies that the banks’ credit ratings are
not suﬃcient statistics for their borrowers’ creditworthiness.
In our analysis of defaults, where we use a semiparametric Cox proportional
hazard model, we ﬁnd that using both the bank rating and the credit bureau’s
rating increases the accuracy of default predictions - except for the very largest
borrowers. This holds irrespective of whether we deﬁne a default using the
credit bureau or the bank deﬁnition. This reinforces our ﬁnding that the bank
ratings contain some private information but are not suﬃcient statistics for their
borrowers’ creditworthiness.
These ﬁndings do not necessarily mean that the banks’ underlying continu-
ous signals are not optimal. Since the discretization and coarsening of the ratings
can lead to a loss of information, it is possible that one of these transformations
of the continuous signals is responsible for the test failure. In simulations we
show that if the number of baskets into which the credit ratings are demarked is
small, that is, less than 10, then enough information can be lost to cause a test
failure. Under such conditions, one would thus expect that a public monitor’s
rating would, in fact, forecast future bank credit ratings. Hence, with discrete
rather than continuous ratings, we cannot always expect to obtain clean Granger
causality tests. Our results further suggest that increasing the number of rating
grades — while in principle desirable — is not a panacea for these problems. One
of the two banks in our sample increased the number of grades in its rating
system without increasing the relative informativeness of its ratings.
Our ﬁndings demonstrate that the ratings of both banks do forecast move-
ments in the credit bureau rating. We take this to be evidence that each bank
has some private information. However, we also provide evidence that credit
bureau ratings can forecast the bank ratings. This ﬁnding can interpreted in
two ways: either the banks fail to incorporate publicly available information
optimally or information is lost by the banks in the process of setting their
ratings.
As a consequence, it is not optimal for either the banks’ risk managers or
for their regulator to accept the bank’s own private credit ratings as the single
measure by which to evaluate of portfolio credit risk. Instead, it would be
beneﬁcial to incorporate more information into a risk review. In particular,
credit bureau ratings could be used to improve overall portfolio risk evaluation.
We have left it open to further research whether the bank credit rating
optimally impounds the credit bureau rating but is too coarse and is updated
5too infrequently, or if the bank rating is in fact suboptimal. It seems to us
possible that the diﬃculty of adding soft information to hard information in
generating credit ratings is greater than has been generally recognized.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we set forth
the theory, develop simulations to more closely mimic the underlying rating
process, and enunciate our hypotheses. In section 3 we describe the data we
use to test the theory. In section 4 we set up a series of tests, including OLS,
Ologit, and dummy variable tests, that seek to account for the possibility that
the credit ratings may not be linear in risk. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e o r y
A well-known theory of banking is that banks possess private information about
the creditworthiness of borrowers. One channel for obtaining this is information
derived from the transaction accounts of borrowers (Mester et al, 2007), which
provides a bank lender with uniquely fresh information about the activities of
its borrowers. If this theory is true, it follows that banks are uniquely suited to
measuring the risks of their borrowers. As a consequence, bank examiners have
been encouraged to use banks’ internal credit ratings as the best available mea-
sure of the risk of the bank loan portfolio. In the language of statistical theory,
these credit ratings are taken to be suﬃcient statistics of the creditworthiness
of loans.
In this section we will set forth a simple theory of signal extraction, that
describes how producers of credit ratings optimally process diﬀerent signals of
a borrower’s creditworthiness. The theory will produce a number of testable
implications for the relation between ratings based on publicly available infor-
mation and ratings based on both publicly and privately obtained information.
In Section 2.1 we formulate a simple theoretical model. Section 2.2 contains a
description of the testable hypotheses implied by the theoretical model . Later
on, n Section 5, we present the results from a number of simulations of the
model in Section 2.1. The purpose of these simulations is to create a setting
w h e r ew ec a nﬁlter out diﬀerences in the relative informativeness of public credit
bureau ratings and internal bank ratings that may be due to other causes than
information collection by banks.
2.1 Model
In our signal extraction model we make three important assumptions. First, we
postulate that bank credit ratings are measures of borrowers’ creditworthiness,
i.e., probability of default. Second, we assume that the creditworthiness of a
borrower is unidimensional Our third assumption is that the bank and credit
bureau ratings measure the same objective underlying risk of default.
By means of our ﬁrst assumption we exclude cases where ratings are loan-
speciﬁc. The second assumption is a common one in credit risk analysis and
implies that credit ratings, for example, do not aim at predicting the bank’s
6potential loss experience once a borrower defaults (LGD). In nearly all models
of default behavior this has been a starting point, among others because there
are, to our knowledge, no formalized theories of loss experience. By the same
assumption, we also exclude cases where ratings reﬂe c tn o to n l yr i s kb u ta l s o
potential proﬁtability. The last assumption is important because diﬀerent deﬁ-
nitions of a default exist, both within the banking industry and between banks
and credit bureaus. A reasonable justiﬁcation for this assumption is that banks
use the ratings of credit bureaus as acceptable measures of borrowers’ probabil-
ity of default (PD), and that bank regulators accept them as such. Given these
three assumptions and provided updating occurs at an appropriate frequency
we can then think of a bank’s credit ratings as intended to capture the riskiness
of its loan portfolio at any moment in time.
In the theoretical model we set up below, banks will have private information
about the creditworthiness of their borrowers. This information is modeled as
a noisy signal that the bank receives. We then show that, if a bank’s credit
ratings capture risk optimally, given the information available to them, those
ratings should forecast movements in the public ratings of a credit bureau. On
the other hand, the credit bureau ratings should not forecast movements in the
bank’s ratings. When the unobserved state, i.e., actual creditworthiness, follows
a random walk with noise, and the signal of creditworthiness, that a monitor
receives, itself is noisy too, we arrive at this result by applying the Kalman
ﬁlter to obtain Muth’s formula on exponentially weighted lags of past signals.
Stated diﬀerently, a monitor’s expectation of creditworthiness turns out to be
an exponentially weighted lag of its past signals, with a base coeﬃcient, ,o n
the current period’s signal. The size of this base coeﬃcient is determined by the
relative noisiness of the monitor’s signal .
We assume that each borrower  has some actual measure of creditworthi-
ness, , that follows a random walk and is only observed with some noise 
that is normally distributed,  ∼ 
¡
02¢
. For notational simplicity we will
however suppress the superscript . Each period, the noise term  permanently
shifts the underlying creditworthiness :
 = −1 +  (1)
There are two monitors indexed by ,  ∈ {}.where  is a bank and 
is a credit bureau. The signal of the underlying creditworthiness that each






If we deﬁne the precision of monitor ’s observation  relative to the
disturbances of the actual creditworthiness, i.e.,  ≡ 22
, then it follows
that 2
 = 2.
For example, the credit bureau  observes a noisy, public signal,  of a
borrower’s creditworthiness :
 =  +  (2)
Because  follows a random walk (1), this implies that:
 = −1 +  +  (3)
7The credit bureau’s rating for any borrower is based on the bureau’s estimate
of creditworthiness, which based on the signal  it receives. Each monitor’s
optimal expectation of the creditworthiness of a borrower  at time  

|,i s
characterized as a function of the noisy signal 

 the monitor observes.
We will use the following notation for a set of frequently used expectations:
| ≡  (|)
|−1 ≡  (|−1)






Here the ﬁrst expectation, |,i st h eﬁltered signal, which we will interpret as
the updated credit rating, and |−1 is the credit rating before receiving the
current period’s signal. The last term is the expected mean square error of the
credit rating.
If the noise terms are normally distributed, then the process by which the
bank updates its credit ratings must be linear in the past period’s rating and
the current signal and equals the following regression equation:
| =( 1− )−1|−1 +  (5)
















Since  = −1++ this estimate incorporates in each period a proportion
 of the current shock  and a proportion 1− of the past shocks incorporated
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  0. A monitor thus updates his expectation of creditworthiness
more slowly as the noise of its signal increases. In Table 1 we display how the
updating coeﬃcient  varies with the precision of monitor’s signal, .T h e
table shows that  falls faster in ranges where  is very small. For example,
doubling the standard deviation of the noise cuts the updating speed in half.
In what may be considered the relevant ranges of precision for a monitor, a
doubling of the relative noise in a signal reduces  by approximately 10 percent.
Table 1: Values of  as a function of 
All entries have been constructed using equation (5)
 3.2 1 0.27 .05 .011 .0026 .00064
 .800 .618 .402 .200 .100 .050 .025
The above equations summarize the rating formation process for a monitor
that receives a single, public signal such as the credit bureau. The bank not
only observes the same public signal as the credit bureau but, in addition, gets
a noisy, private signal, , of borrowers’ actual creditworthiness:







After receiving the signals, the bank aggregates them in proportion to their
precision, to form a composite signal,
 =(  + )( + )













 =  +  (16)
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We shall call the ﬁltered signals credit ratings. It is obvious that the public
monitor’s credit rating will not forecast the bank’s credit rating. The bank’s
credit rating will forecast the public monitor’s credit rating, on the other hand,
for two reasons. One is that the bank has a better ﬁx on the true creditworthi-
ness, because it has private information that the credit bureau does not. The
other reason is more subtle: the bank incorporates the credit bureau signal more
rapidly into its rating than does the credit bureau itself (d  d). That is,
the bank is not simply updating with the credit bureau rating, but is actually
incorporating the information in the credit bureau signal faster than the credit
bureau does itself. It can do so because overall its information is more precise.
If we would translate this updating behavior into a regression model that
aims to explain how credit ratings are revised using both bank ratings and credit
bureau ratings, then the resulting fundamental regression equations would be:
| = 10 + 11|−1 + 12|−1 + 1 (19)
| = 20 + 21|−1 + 22|−1 + 2 (20)
Considering equation (19), we expect that the credit bureau’s rating will
not be able to forecast the bank rating, since the information underlying it is
already embedded in the bank rating, so that 11 =0 . Because the underlying
information follows a random walk, the coeﬃcient on the lagged bank rating
should be unity and the constant term should be zero: the forecasts are expected
to be martingales. For equation (20), we again expect the constant term to be
zero. However, because of the private information encompassed by bank ratings,
the sum of the coeﬃcients of 21 + 22 should be unity and 22 > 0Using












w h e r ew ee x p e c tt h ec o e ﬃcient 11 in the ﬁrst equation to be zero and the
coeﬃcient 21 in the second equation to be positive.
In Section 4 we will test two necessary, but not suﬃcient, conditions for the
optimality of credit ratings: that the bank’s credit rating for borrowers forecasts
10the public monitor’s credit rating but that the public monitor’s credit rating does
not forecast the bank’s credit rating. These are the standard Granger causality
conditions and we could test them using VARs with one lag on each equation,
as in equation (19) and (20) . If the bank’s credit ratings are forecastable by
the public monitor, then this constitutes prima facie evidence that the bank
credit ratings are not suﬃcient statistics for the creditworthiness of the bank
portfolio. It also means that an optimal measure of the risk of the bank portfo-
lio should include measures of borrower quality from outside the bank’s credit
rating system.
When we test the above conditions in Section 4, we will also want to some
quantitative support for interpreting the goodness of ﬁt of an estimated equation
(21) and (22) We therefore derive a general result on the maximum attainable
2 in regression equations (19) and (20). From equation (3) it follows that the
change in the underlying estimate of creditworthiness is:






 +  + −1 − |−1
¢ (23)
Then, because the components  and −1 − |−1 are independent, we

















The change in the credit bureau’s rating can be decomposed into contribu-
tions from the new shock to the underlying creditworthiness, , the new shock
to the signal, , and the error in the credit bureau’s rating at time t-1, −1|−1
The ﬁrst two parts are clearly unforecastable noise terms. So the only part of
the change in the credit bureau’s rating that is potentially forecastable is the
part due to −1|−1that is, 2
−1|−1 = 2
| because of stationarity. Using
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Expression (25) implies that the proportion of the movement in the credit
bureau’s credit rating that can be forecasted based on knowledge of −1 is
2
|2Below, we show that for  = 5, 2
| reaches its maximum at 252
This means that the maximum 2 one can expect based on knowledge at −1,
is 25. This implied maximum will be important later on, in Section 4, when we
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11When  = 5 the parenthetical expression on the right hand side equals zero.
We can show that this derivative is positive for  5 and negative  5.T h i s
will imply that the above expression achieves a global maximum at q=.5.
The sign of expression (26) depends on the sign of the parenthetical ex-
pression on the right-hand side, since the remainder of the expression is always
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This derivative is always negative, because the parenthetical expression on the




 ( +4 )  (2)=2 (28)
This in turn implies that the original expression reaches its maximum at  = 5.
2.2 Hypotheses
In this section we summarize the implications that the simple model we pre-
sented in Section 2.1, has for the relation between public (credit bureau) and
private (bank) borrower ratings. In Section 4, we will test these hypotheses.
In the model, we treat borrower credit ratings as a forecast of the likelihood
of default or of the loan’s expected value. Based on the model, we expect that
the credit bureau’s rating will not be able to forecast the bank rating because the
information contained in credit bureau ratings is already embedded in the bank
rating. In terms of equations (19) and (20), 11 =0 . Because the underlying
information follows a random walk, the coeﬃcient on the lagged bank rating
should be unity and the constant term should be zero. Hence, under rational
expectations, forecasts of bank credit ratings should be martingales. Of course,
conditioned on information outside the information set from which the forecast
has been made, changes in the rating may no longer be unforecastable. As a
consequence, one test of whether one forecast is based on a larger information
set than another (on a reﬁnement of the information set) is that it will be able
to forecast the movements in the other: A cross-sectional information advantage
implies intertemporal advantage.
Hypothesis 1. Changes in a bank’s credit ratings should not be forecastable.
If the credit bureau’s rating does forecast the bank’s future credit ratings,
not only do we know that the bank’s ratings are not suﬃcient statistics, but
the proof is constructive: it tells us how to improve on the bank’s ratings as a
measure of risk.
Corollary 1. If changes in a bank’s credit ratings are forecastable, then (the
variables in) the equation that predicts the change in the bank’s credit
ratings will improve estimates of the riskiness of bank borrowers.
12Corollary 1 also means that if bank credit ratings are forecastable then an
optimal measure of the risk of the bank portfolio should include measures of
borrower quality from outside the bank’s credit rating system.
If a bank has private information, then its ratings should be capable of fore-
casting the credit bureau’s future rating. If it did not do so, then we would
have evidence against the joint hypothesis that the bank (i) has private infor-
mation and (ii) rationally uses this information. Therefore the bank’s credit
rating should forecast the public monitor’s credit rating, for two reasons. One
is that the bank has a better ﬁx on the true creditworthiness, because it has
private information that the credit bureau does not take in. The other reason is
more subtle: the bank incorporates the credit bureau signal more rapidly into
its rating than does the credit bureau itself, i.e.,   .T h a ti s ,t h eb a n ki s
not simply updating with the credit bureau rating, but is actually incorporating
the information in the credit bureau signal faster than the credit bureau does
itself. It can do so because overall its information is more precise.
Another way to think about this is the following. If some agent A’s forecast
of some future event is superior to that of another agent B, this statistically
speaking means that A will be accurate more often than B. Put another way,
t h ef u t u r eo ﬀers fewer surprises for A than for B. If the future event is more than
one period away, and information is revealed in the meantime, it is more likely
that the new information will conﬁrm A’s view of the future than it will B’s. The
forecast of B is then more likely to approach that of A, assuming it is rational,
than that A’s forecast will move toward B’s. As a consequence, A’s current
forecast will tend to forecast B’s future forecast, taking into consideration B’s
current forecast. Even stronger, if A’s forecast is optimal and A knows B’s
forecast, then B’s forecast cannot be better than A’s, and will not forecast A’s
future forecast.
Hypothesis 2 A bank’s internal credit rating should be useful in forecasting
changes in a public credit rating of the same borrower.
If a bank’s internal credit ratings do forecast changes in public credit ratings,
and if the bank’s future ratings are not forecastable by the public credit rating,
it would appear likely that the bank has strictly superior information. We
would then have no evidence against the hypothesis that the bank has private
information it utilizes rationally. Moreover, we would have strong grounds for
the belief that a bank supervisor should use the bank credit ratings in measuring
the risk of the bank’s loan portfolio.
3D a t a
The primary sources of the data are the credit registries of two of the four major
Swedish commercial banks, which we shall call Bank A and Bank B, and the
registry of the leading credit bureau in Sweden, Upplyningscentralen AB (UC),
which we shall call the credit bureau (CB). UC is an incorporated company that
is jointly owned by in principle all Swedish banks. Ownership shares are strongly
13correlated with bank size. Non-ﬁnancial enterprises and all ﬁnancial institutions
report data on loan applications and granted loans to UC. The data set covers
the period starting 1997-Q3, ending 2000-Q1 for Bank A and ending 2000-Q2
for Bank B. Because of a change in the CB rating system, we have deleted the
ﬁrst two quarters of the bank data sets (the original data set began in 1997-
Q1). This gives us between one and 11 quarterly observations for, on average,
roughly 15,000 borrowers in Bank A and one to 12 quarterly observations on
8,000 borrowers in Bank B. Borrowers, incorporated businesses or aktiebolag,
have at least the legally required minimum of SEK 100,000 (approximately
$12,500 at that time ) in equity. Many of them, particularly for Bank A, are
very small. Roughly 37 percent of Bank A’s borrowers are small borrowers,
deﬁned as having maximum borrowing of less than SEK 500,000 (about US$
62,500 in the time period examined), adjusted for inﬂation. About four percent
of Bank B’s borrowers have borrowings this small. Although Bank B has roughly
half as many total borrowers, its number of large borrowers is nearly as large
as in Bank A, with large borrowers deﬁned as having more than SEK 5 million
in maximum borrowing (about US$ 625,000). As Table 2 shows, small and
medium-sized borrowers represent between 60 and 80 percent of all borrowers
but only a small proportion of the total loan portfolio of either lender. A more
complete description of the bank data and credit bureau data can be found in
Jacobson et al. (2006).
Both banks maintain an internal credit rating scheme: Bank A assigns each
business customer to one of 15 credit rating grades, while Bank B uses seven
classes. Higher numbers imply worse ratings and rating grade 15 and 7 in the
respective systems represent defaulted customers. Both banks employ the same
deﬁnition of a default, namely that (i) the principal or interest payments are 60
days overdue, and (ii) a bank oﬃcial has to make a judgement and reach the
conclusion that any such payment is unlikely to occur in the future. Both the
credit bureau’s and the banks’ ratings are "borrower" ratings, not loan-speciﬁc
ratings.
The deﬁnition of default the credit bureau has adopted is the following: a
ﬁrm is given a default status once any of the following events occurs; the ﬁrm
is declared legally bankrupt, has suspended payments, has negotiated a debt
composition settlement, is undergoing a re-construction, or is distraint with-
out assets. To keep track of these events, the credit bureau collects event data
from Tingsrätten (District Court), Bolagsverket (the Swedish Companies Regis-
tration Oﬃce, SCRO), and Kronofogdemyndigheten (the Swedish Enforcement
Authority). Once any of the above distress events occurs, the ﬁrm in question
is at once registered as defaulted. This is observed by us on the last day of that
particular quarter. In the following quarter, we then let the ﬁrm exit our data
set. If more than one of these distress events is observed for a speciﬁc ﬁrm over
our sample period, we assume the ﬁrm in question has defaulted in the quarter
during which the ﬁrst of these events took place. For about 45 percent of the
defaulting ﬁrms one of the other default-triggering events occurs simultaneously,
14i . e .d u r i n gt h es a m eq u a r t e r . 6
In most of our analysis, we will exclude observations where a counterpart
has defaulted because the default rating reﬂects actual behavior rather than
a bank’s estimate of creditworthiness. The only exception will be regressions
where bank defaults are our dependent variable. In those regressions we will
omit observations where borrowers had a default rating at the credit bureau
(e.g., they either ﬁled for bankruptcy or were declared bankrupt). Credit ratings
need to be updated by loan oﬃcers at least once every 12 months. Tables 3−
show that the credit ratings for both lenders are highly concentrated, just as
for U.S. large bank credit ratings. Bank A has some 60 percent of its ratings
in its two largest rating categories, while Bank B has roughly the same amount
in its largest rating category. Table 3 demonstrates that Bank A’s ratings are
not single-peaked. Because of this, and to bring the system of Bank A more in
line with that of Bank B, we have converted the 14 non-bankruptcy grades —
somewhat arbitrarily — into a system of seven ratings that is single peaked. We
grouped ratings 1 to 4, 5 to 7, 8 to 10, and left the remaining, high-risk, grades
unaﬀected.
The credit bureau has ﬁve rating classes in addition to a default rating,
and a numerically higher rating implies higher creditworthiness, the reverse of
the bank ratings. The default rating is assigned if bankruptcy occurs or some
other infrequent events that almost inevitably lead to actual bankruptcy. The
exact deﬁnition of the default dummy is as follows: a ﬁrm obtains the credit
bureau default status once any of the following events occurs: the ﬁrm has
been declared legally bankrupt by District Court, has suspended payments, has
negotiated a debt composition settlement, is undergoing a re-construction, or is
distraint without assets. The distribution of credit bureau ratings is shown in
Tables 4 and 4. It should be noted that Bank A and Bank B’s borrowers
are concentrated in the center of their distributions, while the credit bureau’s
ratings for these same borrowers are concentrated in the top rating. The two
s e t so fr a t i n g st h u sa p p e a rt ob es c a l e dq u i t ed i ﬀerently.
The ratings of the credit bureau are costlessly available to the bank loan
oﬃcers through an on-line computer system. That is, at the time that a loan
oﬃcer establishes the credit rating, the latest available rating from the credit
bureau and a set of background variables from the credit bureau are part of the
loan oﬃcer’s information set.
6About ﬁve percent of the ﬁrms that experience a credit bureau default re-emerge from
their default status. We do not include these re-emerged companies in our data. Nearly all
re-emerging companies default a second and ﬁnal time, mostly in sample and some out of
sample. The vast majority of all terminal credit bureau defaults concern legal bankruptcy
declarations. For the ﬁrms that re-emerge after a default, the ﬁrst default involves a legal
b a n k r u p t c yi nl e s st h a nh a l fap e r c e n to fa l lc a s e sa n d" d i s t r a i n t ,n oa s s e t s "i n9 8p e r c e n t .A t
their second default, these percentages are reversed.
154 Empirical Results
In the theoretical model of Section 2.1, we implicitly made two important as-
sumptions about the format and updating frequency of the credit ratings. To
start with, we inherently treated the bank and the credit bureau as if they are
updated simultaneously in each time period. Moreover, credit ratings were al-
lowed to be continuous. The actual credit rating data depart from these model
assumptions for two reasons.
First, we cannot control for the exact time at which updating of information
sets occurs. Hence, credit ratings may be updated at diﬀerent points in time by
diﬀerent monitors without the data explicitly accounting for diﬀerences in infor-
mation sets. The data-providing banks update their credit ratings at least once
a year, and in practice do so close to once per year on average. The credit bureau
collects data from ﬁnancial institutions, corporations and oﬃcial resources at a
higher frequency. For payments remarks, this occurs more or less daily. while
for other variables this happens at a monthly, quarterly or yearly frequency.
Thus in some instances, the credit bureau may have updated its credit rating
more recently than the bank, thereby potentially allowing it to forecast the bank
rating. At other times, banks may already have received (parts of) a company’s
annual statement, when it hasn’t yet been ﬁled, thereby generating an informa-
tional advantage that doesn’t correspond to what is typically considered private
information in banking theory.
A second deviation from the model’s assumptions exists because credit rat-
ings are categorical variables, not continuous variables. In moving from contin-
uous variables to categorical variables, the bank signal may lose information,
thereby making the credit bureau data more valuable. When bank credit rat-
ings are categorical, some of the information in the public signal is not captured
in the bank’s credit rating. If credit bureau ratings are continuous, this means
that the public monitor’s rating provides information that has been lost in the
aggregation. Then the public monitor’s rating may well predict the bank’s sig-
nal, even though the bank is fully aware of the public signal and "processes" it
optimally. However, when both public and private monitors produce categori-
cal ratings, we can no longer be sure what impact the loss of information due
to converting continuous projections into categorical ratings will have on the
mutual forecasting power of public and private ratings.
Because of the above deviations from our model’s assumptions, testing whether
the necessary conditions speciﬁed in Section 2.1 hold, will not provide us with an
unambiguous test of bank ratings’ optimality Instead, we will use two alterna-
tive, weaker, necessary conditions for optimality, namely that the informational
content of the bank’s credit rating should be greater than that of the public
monitor. In doing so, we rely on the fact that the informational content can
be normalized, because both ratings are eﬀorts to estimate the same underly-
ing variable - namely, the borrower’s creditworthiness. The underlying ﬁltered
signals will therefore have the same variance if the signals are being optimally
forecasted.
Tables 5 through 8 summarize the results from two sets of regressions. In
16Section 4.1 we ﬁrst run OLS regressions for the credit bureau ratings on its
lagged values and then add a bank’s lagged credit rating. We also check the
linearity of the rating systems by using dummy variables for the ratings. Con-
versely, we also present the results of regressions for each bank’s credit rating
on its lagged values. We then also add the credit bureau’s lagged credit rating.
Tables 9 through 11 contain the results from running the same set of regressions
as in Tables 5−7, while using an ordered logit model instead of OLS. In Section
4 . 2w ed i s p l a yt h er e s u l t sf r o ms e v e r a lC ox regressions on the default hazard.
4.1 OLS and ordered logit results
If we deﬁne  as the rating of the bank at ,a n d as the rating of the credit
bureau at  then, under the assumptions in Section 2.1, equations (19) and (20)
translate into the following regressions we can estimate:
 = 1−1 + 1−1 + 1 (29)
Because we explicitly wish to test for the marginal informational value of adding
a lag of the credit bureau rating, we will also estimate the simple autoregressive
form
 = 2−1 + 2 (30)
In a similar fashion, we will estimate two regressions explaining the credit
bureau rating updating process:
 = 1−1 + 1−1 + 1 (31)
 = 2−1 + 2 (32)
In its strictest version, Hypothesis 1 in Section 2.2 implies that 1 =1
and 1 =0  However, because of the staggered updating of information and
categorical nature of the ratings, we will test the weaker hypothesis that 1 =0 
Under this hypothesis, the credit bureau rating does not forecast changes in the
bank rating, or has an insigniﬁcant impact on the residual sum of squares (RSS)
in the regression (29). This is what we would expect of an optimal bank forecast
if it were continuous.
In it strictest version, Hypothesis 2 implies that 1  0 and thus 1  1.7
However, for the same reasons we mentioned in the context of Hypothesis 1, we
will test the weaker hypothesis that 1  0 Under this hypothesis, the bank
rating does forecast changes in the credit bureau rating and has a signiﬁcant
impact on the RSS in regression equation (31).
In each of the Tables 5 6,a n d7 we show the results for six regressions, using
data on borrowers in Bank A, and borrowers in bank B (employing both com-
pressed and uncompressed bank B ratings) respectively. Of the six regressions
in each table, four are exact estimates of equations (29)-(32). The remaining
7In the actual regressions, we expect that 1  0 because higher bank credit ratings imply
higher risk levels, while credit bureau ratings indicate lower risk as the ratings grade increases.
17two are variations where we have included dummy explanatory variables for the
credit ratings instead of a simple one-period lag, in order to allow for nonlin-
earities in the impact on the dependent variable. To verify if our results are
robust to variations in ﬁrm size, we also repeat the regressions for only small,
medium-sized or large ﬁrms. These results are presented in Appendix Tables
1−, 2−,a n d3−.I nT a b l e s9−11, we verify the robustness of our
ﬁndings in Tables 5−7 with respect to estimation method by applying ordered
logit instead of OLS. Thereby we allow the ordering of the relevant dependent
rating variable to occur in a nonlinear fashion with respect to the information
in the explanatory variables. By also including dummy variables in the ordered
logit models, we attempt to control for the widest range of nonlinearities in the
data. Hereafter we will focus on results from the "full" regressions and refer to
the subsets only when diﬀerences occur. When contrasting the results in each
of the Tables 5 − 7, we will focus on the robust t-statistic on the lag of the
credit bureau rating in the regression explaining the bank rating and compare
diﬀerences in the RSS across regressions.
4.1.1 Hypothesis 1
When considering the results for equations (29)-(30), the overall results make
clear that, with between 12,000 and 200,000 observations, even small coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant. For both banks we obtain highly statistically signiﬁcant negative
coeﬃcients for the ﬁrst lag of the credit bureau rating in regressions with a bank
credit rating as the dependent variable (Tables 5 and 7,c o l u m n5 ) . 8 this result is
robust to transformations of the rating scale (Table 5 vs. Table 6), to variation
in ﬁrm size and independent of the estimation method (Tables 5−7 vs. Tables
9−11).9 We also ran regressions where we replace the lagged dependent variable
by lagged dummy variables. However, doing so invariably worsened the ﬁto f
the regression (results are not displayed here, but are available upon request).
The smallest coeﬃcients on the lag of the credit bureau ratings are in the
order of .01-0.2 in the OLS regressions for bank B and in the range 0.05-0.10 for
Bank A. Even taking into account the diﬀerent scales that the two banks employ,
this suggests that credit bureau ratings are more informative for predicting
ratings in Bank A than in Bank B. In columns (4)-(6) of Table 6 we see that Bank
A credit ratings remain relatively forecastable even when they are compressed,
although not as much as the uncompressed ratings. Typically, adding lagged
credit bureau ratings to the regression (column 5) reduces the RSS by more then
when a lag of Bank A’s rating is added to a regression on the credit bureau rating
(column 2). The only exception is made up by the subset of large borrowers.
For those borrowers Bank A’s ratings are, on the margin, more informative in
predicting credit bureau ratings than credit bureau ratings are reversely.
8Coeﬃcients ar negative because credit bureau ratings follow an inverted scale relative to
bank credit ratings.
9The ﬁrm size regressions are presented in the Appendix Tables 1 − 3.T h e A p p e n -
dix is available att www.riksbank.com/research/roszbach and www.phil.frb.org/research-and-
data/economists/nakamura/.
18The general observation that Bank A ratings are less informative is conﬁrmed
by the results in Table 8, columns (3)-(4). There, we summarize the additional
explanatory power of lagged credit bureau ratings when these are added to a
regression of bank credit ratings on their own one-quarter lag. For example,
the number 2.67 in Table 8 equals the percentage decrease in RSS when moving
f r o mc o l u m n4t oc o l u m n4i nT a b l e6). Depending on the size of the borrowers,
credit bureau ratings explain between 2.08 and 3.01 percent of the RSS for Bank
A, compared to .58 - 0.90 percent for Bank B. For Bank A, credit bureau ratings
are most informative in predicting small business ratings. An inspection of the
corresponding results for Bank B reinforces this picture. Adding one lag of
the Bank B rating lowers the RSS of the credit bureau regression substantially
more than adding the same lag of the credit bureau rating lowers Bank B’s
rating RSS. This holds both for the complete sample of borrowers and in all
three of the subsamples. Columns (1) and (2) also make it clear that Bank B
ratings are more informative than Bank A ratings with respect to the credit
bureau ratings, as adding the former reduces the RSS by more than adding the
latter does. The ordered logit regressions in columns (4)-(6) of Tables 9 − 11
broadly conﬁrm the ﬁndings in the OLS regressions.
Overall, the above ﬁndings constitute distinct evidence against the hypoth-
esis that bank ratings are not predicted by lagged credit bureau ratings. More-
over, the results clearly indicate that this holds all the more for bank A , and
that Bank A ratings are relatively less informative.
4.1.2 Hypothesis 2
When examining the robust t-statistic on the lag of the bank rating in a re-
gression of the contemporaneous credit bureau rating, we again ﬁnd highly sig-
niﬁcant negative coeﬃcients in all cases. As before, this ﬁnding is robust to
variations in ﬁrm size, to transformations of the rating scale (Table 5 vs. Table
6), to varying the estimation method (Tables 5−7 vs. Tables 9−11)a n ds t a b l e
across banks (cf. Tables 5 − 6 vs. Table 7).10
In addition, we again verify if the results are robust to an exchange of the
lagged bank rating by a set of lagged rating dummies. The results of this regres-
sion are shown in column (3) of Table 5 and the individual coeﬃcients on the
Bank A rating dummies are displayed in panel  of Table 5. Evidently, there
is nonlinear information in the Bank A ratings. Unfortunately, the coeﬃcients
turn out to be non-monotonic in the rating. In other words. the improvement
in the regression RSS is caused in part by the fact that the order of the ratings
does not properly reﬂecting the risk ranking, as measured by the credit bureau
ratings. The coeﬃcients for Bank A rating grades 5 and 8 are, for example,
signiﬁcantly greater than for the two following ratings, i.e., grades 6-7 and 9-10
respectively. The additional explanatory power of the Bank A rating dummies is
thus due to rating diﬀerences that do not correspond to their ordinal rank! This
is strong prima facie evidence that Bank A’s ratings are not adequately cap-
10Firm-size regressions are available in Appendix Tables 1 − 3.
19turing relative risk and that worse bank credit ratings sometimes correspond to
improved credit bureau ratings. It can then hardly be expected that these bank
credit ratings are strictly ordinally related to an underlying optimal measure of
creditworthiness in any appropriate way.
Some interesting diﬀerences can be observed between the banks. For exam-
ple, if we add the lagged bank A rating in an OLS regressions of the credit
bureau rating on its own lag, then the RSS drops from 55575 (column 1, Table
5) to 55236 (column 2), a reduction of less than 0.6 percent. Interestingly, when
adding the credit bureau rating to a regression of the bank A credit rating on
its own lag the RSS falls to from 174853 to 163526, a decrease of over 6 percent.
Thus, over the entire portfolio, the credit bureau appears to have better infor-
mation than the bank since it has a proportionally bigger impact on the error!
In this context it is worthwhile to recall that we concluded in Section 2.1 that
the maximum attainable decline in the RSS is 25 percent. A decrease of over 6
percent is thus a very large proportion of the change in the signal.
Above, we already argued that the uncompressed Bank A ratings suﬀer from
some suboptimality. The extremely large degree of forecastability of the Bank
A credit ratings oﬀered additional evidence in this direction. As we mentioned
earlier, columns (5)-(6) in Table 6 show that Bank A credit ratings are relatively
well forecastable by public credit bureau ratings. By contrast, appending the
lag of the credit bureau rating to a regression on the Bank B rating in Table
7 only reduces the RSS by 0.8 percent. However, adding the lagged Bank B
rating reduces the RSS of the credit bureau rating regression by 1.3 percent.
Bank B thus has relatively better information than the credit bureau. Ordered
Logit regressions presented in the Appendix show that these ﬁndings are not
sensitive to the estimation method one uses. Even here, Bank B appears as a
relatively better rater.11
On the whole, the above ﬁndings oﬀer strong evidence in support of the
hypothesis that bank ratings predict credit bureau ratings. We also corroborate
our earlier conclusion that Bank A ratings appear less informative than Bank
B ratings.
11The results in the Ordered Logit regressions resemble those in the OLS regressions. Con-
sistent with our earlier ﬁndings, we see in Appendix Tables 4− 5− and 6− that
Bank A is not as apt a rater as Bank B is. A regression of the credit bureau rating on its own
l a gg i v e sap s e u d o - 2 of .5053, and adding the lag of the Bank A compressed rating raises the
pseudo-2 by .0027 to .5080. By comparison, the regression of Bank A’s compressed rating
on its own lag gives a pseudo 2 of approximately .6981. Adding the lagged information
present in the bureau rating improves the ﬁt, by .0053, to .7034. Although the contrast is
not as clear as in the OLS regressions, the ordered logit regressions oﬀer little evidence that
Bank A’s information collection and processing is superior to that by the credit bureau. As
in the OLS regressions, the same image that Bank B is a relatively better rater emerges from
Tables 6−. Adding its lag increases the pseudo-2 of the regression forecasting the credit
bureau rating by .0051, from .5113 to .5164. By contrast, adding the credit bureau lag to the
regression forecasting the Bank B credit rating raises it only .0036.
204.2 Survival time regressions
In the previous section we found that bank ratings, which contain both public
and private information, are only partially able to forecast credit bureau rat-
ings, that are produced using publicly available information. Vice versa, we
showed that, somewhat surprisingly, credit bureau ratings are able to partially
forecast internal bank credit ratings. From a research perspective, an intuitively
attractive conclusion to be drawn from these results would be that credit bu-
reau ratings are of higher quality than one would expect from theory, whereas
bank ratings are less so. If this were the case, then we should at least expect
credit bureau ratings to also be better predictors of credit bureau defaults, i.e.,
bankruptcies, than bank ratings are. Since credit bureau ratings are constructed
to predict bankruptcy whereas bank ratings are designed to predict defaults in
loan portfolios, any other ﬁnding would cast doubt on our conclusions in Section
4.1
To verify if the above proposition holds, we therefore perform an additional
test on the data and compare the explanatory power of bank credit ratings and
credit bureau ratings in a duration model setting. We implement the test by
estimating the following Cox proportional hazards model:
 ()=()+ +  (33)
or equivalently
()=0() (()+ + ) (34)
for a number of competing speciﬁcations. Here, () is the hazard rate of ﬁrm 
at time , ()= 0(),a n dx contains all time-varying covariates. The Cox
model leaves the baseline hazard function unspeciﬁed, thereby making relative
hazard ratios both proportional to each other and independent of time other
than through values of the covariates.
We run three sets of regressions to verify the above assertion. In the ﬁrst
group of regressions, displayed in Table 12, the main variable of interest is a
ﬁrms’ hazard rate, or instantaneous risk of bankruptcy at time  conditional
on survival to that time. First, we let x = −1 to compute the explanatory
power of lagged credit bureau ratings for borrowers in both Bank A and Bank B
(Table 12, columns 3 7). Next, we take x = −1., where  =1 2.( c o l u m n s
1, 5). In column 2 and 4 of these tables, we present results from regressions

























−1 =  and zero otherwise.
21The loglikelihood values in columns 1 and 3 of Table 12 show that the lagged
credit bureau rating is better at explaining bankruptcy hazard rates than the
lagged bank A rating is. This ﬁnding is robust to exchanging the lagged rating
for a set of lagged rating dummies. The table also shows that the same results
are obtained when using bank B ratings instead. The Appendix (Table 7)
contains output from an additional robustness test, where we repeated the above
regressions using a second lag instead of the ﬁrst lag. This does not change the
results qualitatively. As one would expect, the coeﬃcients on the lagged rating
dummies are monotonically increasing in risk for both the credit bureau and
bank ratings. This reﬂects the fact that higher bank ratings and lower credit
bureau ratings should be stronger indicators of future defaults. Hence, hazard
rates should rise (fall) as bank (credit bureau) ratings become higher (lower).
Next, in Table 13, we present the results from a similar set of Cox regressions
where the dependent variable is the instantaneous risk of a default in a bank
at time , conditional on survival to that time. A similar comparison between
columns 1 and 3 makes it clear that for both Bank A and Bank B lagged credit
bureau ratings are better at explaining bank default hazards than bank ratings
are themselves. In the Appendix (Table 8) we again ﬁnd these results are
robust to exchanging the ﬁrst lag by the second lags of the explanatory ratings.
However, when we replace the lagged variables by a set of dummy variables, the
credit bureau ratings lose their edge. This reversal may be indicative of the fact
that the rating grades used by both banks are highly non-linear. Thus when
using a parsimonious model that is linear in its explanatory variable, the bank
ratings have less explanatory power.
In Table 14, we present the log likelihoods of the regressions that include
the credit bureau rating alone, the bank ratings alone, and both credit bureau
ratings and the bank ratings together. We have marked the signiﬁcance of
the likelihood ratio tests for the credit bureau rating for exclusion of the bank
rating, and vice versa. For example, the log likelihood of the model with the
credit bureau rating alone in the regression using credit bureau default, for all
Bank A borrowers, is -1593.2. As the regression that uses both the credit bureau
rating and the Bank A rating has a log likelihood ratio is -1555.2, twice the log
likelihood ratio is 76.0, making the Bank A rating very signiﬁcant in a chi-square
test with one degree of freedom. As can be seen, neither the bank ratings nor
the credit bureau ratings are on their own suﬃcient statistics of default. This
is true for both Bank A and Bank B and for both deﬁnitions of default; it
also holds when we lag both ratings an additional period. In particular, this
provides striking evidence that the credit bureau rating adds information to the
bank rating, even though the bank loan oﬃcers have ready access to the credit
bureau ratings when they make their ratings.
In the Appendix Tables A-15 to A-17, we provide additional results on the log
likelihoods and exclusion tests for subsets of small, medium, and large borrowers.
An interesting conclusion from those tables is that the credit bureau ratings do
notably better than bank ratings for small borrowers, while the reverse tends
to be true for the large borrowers.
225 Simulations
For both the banks that we study, we have found that the credit bureau ratings
forecast bank credit ratings. A direct implication of this is that a bank’s ratings
alone are not the best possible measure of the bank’s portfolio’s underlying
overall creditworthiness. But there are two reasons, not mutually exclusive, why
this could be happening. One possibility is that the bank’s credit ratings do not
impound the credit bureau’s data optimally. The bank’s loan oﬃcers may, for
example, overvalue their private information vis-a-vis the credit bureau’s rating.
Another possibility is that the rating process itself, for example through the
requirement that ratings be categorical, may reduce the information embedded
in the ratings.
The ﬁrst of these two causes is relatively hard to evaluate. However, as
we argued in Section 4, the potentially staggered nature of rating updating
and the categorical nature of the ratings in practice leads to deviations from
our model assumptions. As a result we need to resort to a weaker optimality
test than our model suggests. In this section, we therefore attempt to quantify
how the above two characteristics aﬀect our ﬁndings. Therefore, we simulate
data for the model in Section 2.1 and estimating regressions that increasingly
and step-by-step account for the possibility of staggered rating updating and
categorization of discretization of initially continuous credit ratings.
For the simulations we generate 1,000 data series from a random walk process,
each over 20 periods, which we think of as being quarters. In each period the
random walk processes, which all start at time zero, receive a standard normal
shock. The monitors receive signals that include noise: the random walk plus
a normal temporary noise. As in the model, there are two sources of noise: the
public signal’s noise, and the bank monitor’s noise. To capture the idea that
banks collect private information in our simulations, the public signal noise will
have a variance of 10, while the bank has a private signal with a variance of
2.5. The underlying creditworthiness of each borrower has a disturbance term
that is a standard normal. The credit bureau processes a single signal, while
the bank combine the public signal with its private signal. From these data, we
can construct the credit bureau and bank signals, and the optimal Kalman ﬁlter
that associated with them. In one of our experiments, we contrast these con-
tinuous signals with categorical credit ratings, which are created by aggregating
the continuous signals ordinally.
The credit bureau’s signal has a relative precision of .1. The bank’s private
signal has a precision of .4, but to this is added the credit bureau’s signal Once
combined with the credit bureau’s signal, the bank’s signal has a precision of .5
(an idiosyncratic variance of 2). To limit the problems associated with the long
run increasing variance of the random walk, we focus on one time period, namely
period 20. In the 20th period (5 years) the standard deviation of ratings is 4.4
for the bank and 4.2 for the credit bureau. The theoretical standard deviation
of creditworthiness is 20.5 = 4.472, while the actual standard deviation in the
sample is 4.4702. The theoretical 4-quarter-ahead expected forecast variance is
4.
23As preliminary evidence on the eﬀect that coarsening of the data has, we
measure the contemporaneous correlations between our simulated ratings. Note
that the correlations between the credit ratings of the credit bureau and the
credit ratings of banks are much lower than in the simulation. Tables 15 − 
showed the quarterly correlations ranging from 0.29 to 0.57, which is substan-
tially lower than the correlations in the simulated data (not reported). This
variation over time may in fact explain some of the anomalies in the data and
the concomitant results with respect to Bank A. Bank B’s correlations with the
credit bureau appear fairly consistent over time. Bank A’s correlations, how-
ever, vary considerably and appear in general to drift downward except for an
abrupt rise in 1999 Q2, followed by a resumption of the downward drift. It
is also worth noting that the correlations are systematically lower for original
Bank A ratings than when these are coarsened to 7 grades. The extra infor-
mation in the ratings does not appear to be correlated with information in the
credit bureau ratings. Additional analysis (not presented here) shows that the
correlations are more or less unchanged when we use rank correlations instead.
In the Appendix, we present the results from an OLS regression on simulated
data where credit ratings are continuous and rating updating takes place without
staggering.12 In a regression of the credit bureau rating on one lag of itself, the
lag of the bank rating is highly signiﬁcant when added. Moreover, when added
to a regression of the simulated bank credit rating on a lag of itself, the lag credit
bureau rating is not signiﬁcant. The contemporaneous correlation between the
bank and credit bureau two ratings in the simulated data is .9764.
In a second simulation, we stagger the data so that one-fourth of the credit
ratings by each monitor are updated each quarter. This has a modest but sig-
niﬁcant impact on the regressions: the coeﬃcient on the lagged credit bureau
rating is now positive and signiﬁcant, albeit small. Staggering of information
updating thus has a signiﬁcant but quantitatively modest impact on the appar-
ent explanatory power of public ratings. However, it does make our test less
clean because we cannot exclude the possibility that a rejection of hypothesis 1
is due to staggering of information updating. The contemporaneous correlation
is now .9436.
This eﬀect is reinforced when we discretize the continuous signals, even if we
do not stagger the data. When we break up the continuous signals into six evenly
spaced categories and re-run the above set of regressions , the coeﬃcient on the
lagged credit bureau rating becomes both signiﬁcant and quantitatively more
important. In addition, the residual sum of squares (RSS) of forecasts of the
bank’s credit ratings drops substantially when the lagged credit bureau rating
is included. Interestingly, the contemporaneous correlation falls only slightly, to
.9436. When we simulate data that is both staggered and aggregated into six
intervals, the outcomes reveal that there is no monotonic relationship between
the noisiness of the ratings and the size of coeﬃcient for the lagged bank rating.
The simulations do suggest that the RSS falls monotonically as ratings become
more noisy. Similar results are obtained when ordered logit models are estimated
12The results in this Section are summarized in Appendix Tables 9 − 14.
24instead of OLS.
Evidently, coarsening the data by placing it in as many as six categories
reduces the ability of the ratings to forecast. Coarsening thus creates a greater
role for the credit bureau variable, even though, as here, the credit bureau
does not contain any truly independent information. Conversely, this warns us
that the bank credit ratings may appear to contain information when they do
not. Similarly, when information updating by monitors occurs in a staggered
way, credit bureau ratings will have predictive power in explaining bank credit
ratings. Most importantly, in relation to our analysis in Section 4, the above
simulations indicate that our ﬁnding that bank credit ratings can be explained
by credit bureau ratings and vice versa can be driven by a combination of
factors: ineﬃcient information collection by banks, loss of information when
private information is converted into discrete ratings grades, and information
lags due to infrequent and staggered updating of the information underlying
bank ratings.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper proposes a new basket of straightforward techniques that enable
both ﬁnancial institutions and regulators to assess the performance of banks’
credit ratings systems. We develop and test a method for quantifying the ability
of a bank to monitor its commercial loans. The method exploits the implied
forecasting power of informationally superior monitors in estimates of borrowers
creditworthiness. By using both internal bank credit ratings and external credit
bureau ratings of corporate borrowers, we can investigate if bank credit ratings
are able to forecast the ratings of a public monitor. The techniques can also be
applied to bond ratings for larger commercial loans.
Our results contain evidence that some banks have superior information
relative to a credit bureau whose ratings are produced using public information
only. We also present evidence that other banks will not necessarily pass this
test. When exploring to what extent these diﬀerences between the two lenders
are reﬂected also in their ability to predict default, we show that both lenders
fail to pass the stringent test we formulate. Our public monitor’s ratings are
f o u n dt oh a v ep r e d i c t i v ep o w e rf o rf u t u r ec h a n g e si nt h er a t i n g so ft h eb a n k s .
This implies that the banks’ credit ratings are not suﬃcient statistics for their
borrowers’ creditworthiness.
Using simulations we explain that our ﬁndings do not necessarily mean that
the banks’ continuous estimates of borrower default risk are not optimal..The
discretization and coarsening of ratings can lead to a loss of information, making
it possible that discrete ratings based on optimal default risk estimates fail our
test. Under certain conditions, a public monitor’s rating will in fact forecast
future bank credit ratings. Our simulations suggest that increasing the number
of rating grades does not necessarily solve these problems.
Our ﬁndings can interpreted in two ways. One is that banks fail to incor-
porate publicly available information optimally. The other is that banks lose
25information in the process of generating credit ratings. Irrespective of the in-
terpretation, this means that it is not optimal for either banks’ risk managers
or for their regulators to accept the bank’s own private credit ratings as the
single measure by which to evaluate of portfolio credit risk. Instead, it would
be beneﬁcial to incorporate more information into a risk review. In particular,
credit bureau ratings could be used to improve overall portfolio risk evaluation.
Our analysis raises a number of deeper questions about the optimal way
for banks to assess the creditworthiness of their customers. Why do banks use
relative crude rating gradations instead of continuous assessments of default
risk? Why does expanding the number of ratings in a way that increases their
informativeness appear to be diﬃcult? These questions are important issues for
future research to address.
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27Table 2: Descriptive statistics on loans outstanding
The table contains descriptive statistics on actually utilized credit in banks A and B. All numbers are
averages over four years, i.e., over the period 1997Q1 to 2000Q1
          Bank A          Bank B
Total Large Medium Small Total Large Medium Small
Total loan outstandings (Billion SEK) 91.7 85.3 5.73 0.664 110 103 7.07 0.845
Mean loan size (Million SEK) 4.397 20.8 0.639 0.085 10.4 25.9 1.141 0.204
Number of Loans,  quarterly average 20851 4103 8954 7794 10586 3979 6192 415
28Table 3A. Empirical distribution of bank ratings for Bank A borrowers
All numbers are over four years, i.e., over the period 1997Q1 to 2000Q1. Higher ratings
imply worse creditworthiness. Observation are defined as quarter-borrower pairs.
Rating Observations Percent Cumulative
1 157 0,08 0,08
2 505 0,24 0,32
3 887 0,43 0,74
4 1 833 0,88 1,62
5 17 817 8,54 10,17
6 26 532 12,72 22,89
7 6 477 3,11 26,00
8 26 843 12,87 38,87
9 61 346 29,42 68,29
10 21 466 10,29 78,59
11 30 003 14,39 92,98
12 9 363 4,49 97,47
13 3 589 1,72 99,19




29Table 3B. Distribution of compressed bank ratings for Bank A borrowers
Ratings have been compressed into seven instead of 14 grades. All numbers are over 
four years, i.e., over the period 1997Q1 to 2000Q1. Higher ratings imply worse 
creditworthiness. Observations are defined as quarterly-borrower observation.
Rating Observations Percent Cumulative
1 3 382 1,62 1,62
2 50 826 24,38 26,00
3 109 655 52,59 78,59
4 30 003 14,39 92,98
5 9 363 4,49 97,47
6 3 589 1,72 99,19




30Table 3C. Distribution of bank ratings for Bank B borrowers
All numbers are over four years, i.e., over the period 1997Q1 to 2000Q1.
 Higher ratings imply worse creditworthiness. Observations are defined as 
quarter-borrower pairs.
Rating Observations Percent Cumulative
1 57 0,05 0,05
2 2 835 2,43 2,48
3 29 764 25,56 28,04
4 70 987 60,96 89,01
5 11 574 9,94 98,95




31Table 4A. Empirical distribution of credit bureau ratings for Bank A borrowers
All numbers are over four years, i.e., over the period 1997Q1 to 2000Q1. Higher ratings imply 
improved creditworthiness. An observation is defined as a quarterly-borrower observation.
Rating Observations Percent Cumulative
1 7 546 3.62 3.62
2 12 353 5.92 9.54
3 43 160 20.70 30.24
4 55 120 26.43 56.68




32Table 4B. Empirical distribution of credit bureau ratings for Bank B borrowers
All numbers are over four years, i.e., over the period 1997Q1 to 2000Q1. Higher ratings imply  
improved creditworthiness. An observation is defined as a quarterly-borrower observation.
Rating Observations Percent Cumulative
1 4 731 4.06 4.06
2 7 700 6.67 10.74
3 31 714 27.24 37.97
4 33 816 29.04 67.01




33Table 5: OLS regressions with all borrowers, credit bureau and Bank A
Sample period is 1997Q3 to 2000Q1, standard errors are robust.
 Dependent variable
Explanatory variables                  Credit bureau rating              Bank A rating    
Constant .480 .711 .711 0.859 1.472 1.470
(.00494) (.00861) (.0357) (.0110) (.0189)
Lag credit bureau rating .885 .870 .856 -.110
(.00111) (.00123) (.00135) (.00225)
Lag Bank A rating -.020 .908 .887 .887
(.00057) (.00115) (.00133) (.00133)
Credit bureau rating dummies No No No No No Yes
Bank rating dummies No No Yes No No No
Residual Sum of Squares 55575 55236 54889 174853 163526 172059
Adj. R
2 .7784 .7798 .7811 .8226 .8252 .8255
Nobs 208514 208514 208514 208514 208514 208514
34Table 5, panel B. Regressions with all borrowers, credit bureau and Bank A
The table contains details of the regression in Table 5, column 3, of the credit bureau
rating on its lag and dummies of Bank A ratings, 1997Q3 to 2000Q1. Standard errors 
are robust. A * indicates that a coefficient is significantly different from that on the 
following two ratings at the 1 percent confidence level.
Variable Coefficient S.e.
constant .711 .036
lagged credit bureau rating .856 .001
dummy Bank A rating 2 -.056 .041
dummy Bank A rating 3 -.071 .038
dummy Bank A rating 4 -.062 .037
dummy Bank A rating 5* -.083 .035
dummy Bank A rating 6 -.031 .035
dummy Bank A rating 7 -.028 .035
dummy Bank A rating 8* -.144 .035
dummy Bank A rating 9 -.118 .035
dummy Bank A rating 10 -.060 .035
dummy Bank A rating 11 -.179 .035
dummy Bank A rating 12 -.254 .036
dummy Bank A rating 13 -.301 .037
dummy Bank A rating 14 -.391 .037
35Table 6: OLS regressions with all borrowers, credit bureau and Bank A (compressed)
Bank A ratings have been compressed from 15 to 8 grades. Sample period is 1997Q3 to 2000Q1, 
standard errors are robust.
 Dependent variable
Explanatory variables                  Credit bureau rating              Bank A rating    
Constant .480 .760 .632 0.217 .544 .579
(.00494) (.00868) (.0102) (.00323) (.00816) (.0119)
Lag credit bureau rating .885 .861 .860 -.0599
(.00111) (.00131) (.00132) (.00122)
Lag Bank A rating -.0612 .938 .907 .907
(.0041) (.00105) (.00130) (.00135)
Credit bureau rating dummies No No No No No Yes
Bank rating dummies No No Yes No No No
Residual Sum of Squares 55575 55021 55001 26540 25831 26540
Adj. R
2 .7784 .7806 .7807 .8610 .8647 .8652
Nobs 55575 55021 55001 26540 25831 26540
36Table 7: OLS regressions with all borrowers, credit bureau and Bank B
Sample period is 1997Q3 to 2000Q1, standard errors are robust.
 Dependent variable
Explanatory variables                  Credit bureau rating              Bank B rating    
Constant 0.449 0.941 0.700 .162 .286 .279
(.00593) (.0144) (.0476) (.00444) (.00703) (.00760)
Lag credit bureau rating 0.886 0.858 0.857 -.01907
(.00142) (.00169) (.00170) (.0026)
Lag Bank B rating -0.102 .960 .947 .947
(.00251) (.00116) (.00133) (.00134)
Credit bureau rating dummies No No No No No Yes
Bank rating dummies No No Yes No No No
Residual Sum of Squares 30607 30163 30147 4981 4940 4939
Adj. R
2 .7802 .7833 .7835 .9079 .9087 .9087
Nobs 116445 116445 116445 116445 116445 116445
37Table 8: Explanatory power of lagged bank ratings or credit bureau ratings in OLS regressions
Entries in the table reflect the percentage by which the residual sum of squares is reduced when a one- 
period lag of bank ratings or credit bureau ratings is introduced as an explanatory variable in addition  
to the lagged dependent variable Tables 5, 6 and 7.
Dependent variable         Credit bureau rating Bank A rating Bank B rating    
compressed
Explanatory variable added Bank A rating Bank B rating             Credit bureau rating
compressed
All borrowers 1.00 1.45 2.67 0.82
Small borrowers 0.93 1.21 3.01 0.58
Medium-sized borrowers 1.04 1.40 2.63 0.90
Large borrowers 1.01 1.52 2.08 0.68
38Table 9: Ordered logit regressions with all borrowers, credit bureau and Bank A
Sample period is 1997Q3 to 2000Q1, standard errors are robust.
 Dependent variable
Explanatory variables                  Credit bureau rating              Bank A rating    
Constant 4.682 3.705 3.820 3.372 2.955 2.585
(0.026) (0.039) (0.210) (0.072) (0.075) (0.076)
Lag credit bureau rating 3.307 3.260 3.219 -0.087
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003)
Lag Bank A rating -0.086 2.805 2.793 2.789
(0.003) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Credit bureau rating dummies No No No No No Yes
Bank rating dummies No No Yes No No No
Pseudo-R
2 .5053 .5072 .5097 .5176 .5181 .5189
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R
2 .799 .801 .803 .919 .919 .919
BIC 273945 272907 271684 411620 412294 412652
Nobs 208514 208514 208514 208514 208514 208514
39Table 10: Ordered logit regressions with all borrowers, credit bureau and Bank A (compressed)
Bank A ratings have been compressed from 15 to 8 grades. Sample period is 1997Q3 to 2000Q1, 
standard errors are robust.
 Dependent variable
Explanatory variables                 Credit bureau rating              Bank A rating    
Constant 4.682 3.607 4.105 6.653 4.708 5.205
(0.026) (0.037) (0.053) (0.038) (0.048) (0.055)
Lag credit bureau rating 3.307 3.240 3.236 -0.398
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006)
Lag Bank A rating -0.235 5.428 5.347 5.347
(0.006) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Credit bureau rating dummies No No No No No Yes
Bank rating dummies No No Yes No No No
Pseudo-R
2 .5053 .5080 .5085 .6981 .7034 .7035
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R
2 .799 .802 .802 .889 .894 .894
BIC 273945 272477 272292 160754 157963 157949
Nobs 208514 208514 208514 208514 208514 208514
40Table 11: Ordered logit regressions with all borrowers, credit bureau and Bank B
Sample period is 1997Q3 to 2000Q1, standard errors are robust.
 Dependent variable
Explanatory variables                  Credit bureau rating              Bank B rating    
Constant 4.827 2.618 3.809 9.856 7.492 7.859
(0.034) (0.061) (0.278) (0.177) (0.187) (0.190)
Lag credit bureau rating 3.419 3.333 3.330 -0.444
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Lag Bank B rating -0.473 7.205 7.063 7.069
(0.011) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Credit bureau rating dummies No No No No No Yes
Bank rating dummies No No Yes No No No
Pseudo-R
2 .5113 .5164 .5165 .8125 .8161 .8162
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R
2 .809 .813 .813 .878 .884 .884
BIC 158263 156624 156614 44694 43849 43861
Nobs 116445 116445 116445 116445 116445 116445
41Table 12: Cox regressions on Credit Bureau defaults
The Breslow method has been used for tied observations.
A * indicates that the variable had to be dropped because no defaults occur for the dependent variable at the relevant lag.
The "-" sign indicates that the particular RHS variable is not available for this regression.
Dependent variable: Credit bureau default
Explanatory variables   RHS: Lag 1, Bank A or CB  RHS: Lag 1, Bank B or CB
Lag credit bureau rating 0.30 0.33
(0.019) (0.025)
Lag bank rating 2.39 3.45
(0.098) (0.26)
Lag, Dummy bank rating = 2 0.068 *
(0.029)
Lag, Dummy bank rating = 3 0.12 *
(0.041)
Lag, Dummy bank rating = 4 0.39 4.50
(0.13) (1.93)
Lag, Dummy bank rating = 5 1.20 32.59
(0.41) (13.92)
Lag, Dummy bank rating = 6 2.84 55.62
(0.98) (28.24)
Lag, Dummy bank rating = 7 4.27 -
(1.55)
Lag, Dummy CB rating = 1 73.07 77.74
(22.60) (36.49)
Lag, Dummy CB rating = 2 23.54 33.30
(7.73) (15.93)
Lag, Dummy CB rating = 3 5.15 7.22
(1.74) (3.48)
Lag, Dummy CB rating = 4 1.64 3.23
(0.67) (1.69)
Residual Sum of Squares
Number of subjects 31991 31991 31991 31991 17831 17831 17831 17831
Number of failures 180 180 180 180 136 136 136 136
Nobs 216968 216968 216968 216968 122927 122927 122927 122927
Loglikelihood -1634.7 -1654.9 -1593.2 -1590.5 -1180.1 -1181.9 -1151.0 -1149.5
42Table 13: Cox regressions on Bank defaults
The Breslow method has been used for tied observations.
A * indicates that the variable had to be dropped because no defaults occur for the dependent variable at the relevant lag.
The "-" sign indicates that the particular RHS variable is not available for this regression.
Dependent variable: Bank A default Dependent variable: Bank B default
Explanatory variables   RHS: Lag 1, Bank A or CB  RHS: Lag 1, Bank B or CB
Lag credit bureau rating .27 0.31
(.013) (0.020)
Lag bank rating 3.04 5.74
(0.11) (0.54)
Lag, Dummy bank rating = 2 **
Lag, Dummy bank rating = 3 2.16 *
(0.70)
Lag, Dummy bank rating = 4 10.37 10.09
(3.29) (5.96)
Lag, Dummy bank rating = 5 40.39 73.18
(12.58) (43.13)
Lag, Dummy bank rating = 6 81.98 275.73
(26.17) (167.53)
Lag, Dummy bank rating = 7 216.54 -
(67.64)
Lag, Dummy CB rating = 1 32.44 9.92
(5.76) (2.24)
Lag, Dummy CB rating = 2 10.23 3.37
(2.02) (0.88)
Lag, Dummy CB rating = 3 2.55 1.35
(0.51) (0.31)
Lag, Dummy CB rating = 4 0.97 0.67
(0.24) (0.18)
Residual Sum of Squares
Number of subjects 31965 31965 31965 31965 17777 17777 17777 17777
Number of failures 315 315 315 315 166 166 166 166
Nobs 216427 216427 216427 216427 122421 122421 122421 122421
Loglikelihood -2730.8 -2722.3 -2722.4 -2869.7 -1405.7 -1403.4 -1380.6 -1490.7
43Table 14: Log Likelihoods in Cox proportional hazards model; All borrowers
Loglikelihood values for models with only one RHS variable are taken from Tables 13-14 (lag 1) and Appendix 
Tables A.7-A.8 (lag 2). Loglikelihood values for models with both CB and bank rating on the RHS are not reported 
elsewhere and provided for LR exclusion tests in the lower panel of the Table. Significance of an additional RHS
variable is shown at the 10 (*), 5 (**), 1 (***), and 0.1 (****) levels.
In the likelihood ratio tests (lower panel), the value displayed is 2*log(likelihood ratio).
     D e p e nd e nt      v a r i a b l e
      Credit bureau default         Bank default
Explanatory variables Bank A Bank B Bank A Bank B
Lag of CB rating -1593.2 -1151.0 -2722.4 -1380.6
Lag of Bank Rating -1634.7 -1180.1 -2730.8 -1405.7
Lag of CB and Bank Rating -1555.2 -1123.1 -2597.4 -1335.1
Lag 2 of CB rating -1442.6 -940.2 -3192.9 -1558.3
Lag 2 of Bank Rating -1476.3 -966.9 -3283.5 -1596.8
Lag 2 of CB and Bank Rating -1423.0 -925.3 -3128.3 -1520.5
Likelihood ratio tests for exclusion of particular lags
First Lag Only
Exclusion of Lag of Bank Rating 76.0 **** 55.9 **** 249.9 **** 91.1 ****
Exclusion of Lag of CB Rating 159.0 **** 114.1 **** 266.7 **** 141.3 ****
Second Lag Only
Exclusion of Lag 2 of Bank Rating 39.2 **** 29.7 **** 129.2 **** 75.6 ****
Exclusion of Lag 2 of CB Rating 106.6 **** 83.1 **** 310.2 **** 152.5 ****
44Table 15A. Correlations by between credit bureau and bank ratings 
Correlations are per quarter, scale is inverted for bank ratings.
Bank A Bank A Bank B
Quarter Compressed scale
1997 Q3         .4532 .4934 .4589
1997 Q4      .4381 .4847 .4771
1998 Q1     .4059 .4569 .4658
1998 Q2 .3625 .4414 .4614
1998 Q3 .3401 .4145 .4489
1998 Q4 .3087 .3892 .4453
1999 Q1     .2850 .3601 .4389
1999 Q2 .4776 .5728 .4285
1999 Q3 .4293 .5254 .4330
1999 Q4 .3794 .4781 .4245
2000 Q1 .3367 .4342 .4175
2000 Q2 .4214
All quarters .3765 .4559 .4427
45Table 15B. Correlations by between credit bureau and bank ratings 
Correlations are per quarter, scale is inverted for bank ratings. Only 
observations drawn on in the regressions are used in the calculations.
Bank A Bank A Bank B
Quarter Compressed scale
1997 Q3        
1997 Q4      .4457 .4931 .4843
1998 Q1     .4130 .4664 .4685
1998 Q2 .3849 .4753 .4643
1998 Q3 .3449 .4240 .4528
1998 Q4 .3168 .4015 .4474
1999 Q1     .2927 .3719 .4482
1999 Q2 .4908 .5900 .4325
1999 Q3 .4414 .5425 .4383
1999 Q4 .3922 .4954 .4323
2000 Q1 .3474 .4501 .4266
2000 Q2 .4284
All quarters .3834 .4709 .4472
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